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The deconstruction method was used to analyze a seminal text in transaction cost
economics, viz., Oliver Williamson's Economic Institutions of Capitalism. This
deconstructive reading revealed that the assumption of opportunism that gives rise to the
problem of economic organization as formulated by Williamson also tends to undermine
the proposed solution to this problem. The plausibility of unified governance as a
solution to the problem of opportunism in the case of asset specificity is shown to hinge
on the temporary deferment of the assumption of opportunism. Thus, transaction cost
economics finds itself in an impasse of thought: actors have to be assumed to be
opportunistic and not-opportunistic if the logic of the theory is to be maintained.z
THE ARGUMENTATIONAL TEXTURE OF TRANSACTION COST
ECONOMICS
ABSTRACT
The deconstruction method was used to analyze a seminal text in transaction cost
economics, viz., Oliver Williamson's Economic lnstitutions of Capitalism. This
deconstructive reading revealed that the assumption of opportunism that gives rise to the
problem of economic organization as formulated by Williamson also tends to undermine
the proposed solution to this problem. The plausibility of unified governance as a
solution to the problem of opportunism in the case of asset specificity is shown to hinge
on the temporary deferment of the assumption of opportunism. Thus, transaction cost
economics finds itself in an impasse of thought: actors have to be assumed to be
opportunistic and not-opportunistic if the logic of the theory is to be maintained.
1. INTRODUCTION
Criticisms of transaction cost economics (TCE) abound, particularly in the management
and organization literature (e.g., Donaldson 1990; Dow 1987; Francis et al. 1983;
Johanson and Mattsson 1987; Perrow 1986; Robbins 1987). Critics of TCE attempt to
show that the theory is at variance with empirical facts, compare TCE with other
theories with purportedly more explanatory power, or identify contradictions in the
argumentation. The analysis in this article is in this last vein in that TCE is criticised
TCE from within, drawing on arguments supplied by a reading of a seminal text.
This reading is informed by the deconstruction method, developed by the French
philosopher Jacques Derrida (1977; 1978; 1983), which follows closely the
argumentational movements of the text, but which also focuses on the lacunas,
inconsistencies and symptomatic abberations to be found in every text (Vasterling 1987).
This approach is based on a postmodern philosophy of language. Only some basic
features of this philosophy will be sketched in the article; no attempt will be made to do
justice to Derrida's philosophical project as a whole. The goal of this article is to show
that transaction cost economics engenders paradoxes or undecidables. Deconstruction is
a tool that can help accomplish this task.
Whereas Derrida in continental Europe is first and foremost a philosopher, in
Britain and the U.S.A. his ideas have taken root predominantly in cultural and literary
theory (Dews 1987: XIV; Noms 1991: 144). Consequently, the reception of
deconstruction in organization theory has been indirect, as secondary texts from the field
of literary criticism are often used as a source of ideas on deconstruction, rather than the
less accessible philosophical texts. Likewise, in this article, McCloskey's (1983: 499)
suggestion to apply procedures of modern literary criticism to texts in economics is
followed. Apart from philosophical texts, secondary sources from the field of literary
theory were used to elucidate the analytical procedure of deconstruction.
This article is part of a growing stream of publications. Several papers on the
impact of postmodern philosophy on organizational theorizing have appeared (Burrell
1988; Cooper and Burrell 1988; and Parker 1992). The deconstruction method has been
brought to bear on bureaucracy (Cooper 1989), gender conflict (Martin 1990),3
leadership (Calás and Smircich 1991), bounded rationality (Mumby and Putnam 1992),
and the model of man employed in organization theory (Kilduff 1993). There appear to
have been no applications to organizational economics.
The composition of this article is as follows: in Section Two, Demda's philosophy
of language is discussed briefly, and the deconstruction method is described and
simplified to two general principles and four procecíural rules (although this description
and simplification in itself constitutes a breach of the unwritten rules of deconstruction,
Norris 1991: 31). Section T'hree is an analysis of the argumentation in the most
influential text in the field of TCE, viz., Oliver Williamson's Economic Institutions of
Capitalism (Williamson 1985). Subsequently, this argumentation is deconstructed, and
the uncomfortable relationship between "opportunism" and "govemance" is
demonstrated. Implications for theorizing on economic organization and conclusions
follow in Section Four.
2. DECONSTRUCTION AS A PROCEDURE OF ANALYSIS
Derrida's Philosophy of Language
Derrida's philosophy of language is based on that of the Swiss linguist Ferdinand de
Saussure (1857-1913).' Saussure distínguishes two aspects of language: "signifier" and
"signified". A signifier is a meaningful sound or a meaningful mark inscribed on a page.
This is the material aspect of language. A signified is the concept to which the signifier
refers; this is the mental aspect of language. Note that the signified is not an element of
the world around us, a"referent". "The signified is not a thing but the notion of a thing,
what comes into the mind of the speaker or heuer when the appropriate signifier is
uttered" (Sturrock 1979: 6).
Signifier and signified are inseparable: no concept can be said to exist unless it has
found expression in a signifier, and a sound or inscription that is meaningless cannot be
said to be a"signifier". Language is "the very fabric of ineaning rather than its
incidental clothing" (Dews 1987: 17). Yet there is no natural, only a conventional or
institutional link between signifier and signified. There is nothing in the sound of the
word "horse" or in the form of the letters forming this word on a page that intrinsically
connect it to the concept of a"solid-hoofed quadruped with long mane and tail, ridden
and used as beast of burden".
Language is therefore a differential system, the identity of a signifier can only be
established by distinguishing it from other signifiers: "rock" can phonetically be
distinguished from such words as "ruck" or "wreck", which abut on it acoustically.
Semantically, that is, on the level of the signified, the meaning of a word like "rock" is
determined by differentiating it from contiguous concepts like "stone", "boulder" or
"cliff" (Sturrock 1979: 10).
Derrida's deconstruction procedure builds on these insights. Since words can only
be defined using other words, there is in the system of language no benchmark that can
be used to assign definite meaning to its elements. It is therefore impossible to construct
a completely coherent and adequate theoretical system: "the exercise of language and
thought involves us in intractable paradoxes, which we cannot escape but only repress"
(Culler 1979: 156).4
The L,ogic of Supplementariry
Derrida has made it his task to track down these "intractable paradoxes" in linguistic,
philosophical and literary texts. The strategy of deconstruction in this operation is to
focus on the binary oppositions authors use to construct their argumentation. Thus
Rousseau elaborates on the opposition between nature and culture, the first being pure,
uncorrupted and anterior, the second being posterior, a corruption and impurity of
nature. Nature pre-existed and formed a plenitude; culture is a parasite that can only
flourish on the soil of nature. The opposition, like many in philosophical texts, is clearly
hierarchical: "in classical philosophical opposition we are not dealing with the peaceful
coexistence of a vis à vis, but rather with a violent hierarchy. One of the two terms
governs the other (axiologically, logically, etc.) or has the upper hand" (Derrida, quoted
in Gasché 1986: 137).
But on the other hand, Rousseau can define nature only as an absence of culture.
In this sense, the meaning of "culture" enters into that of "nature", and to state that one
is anterior to the other becomes utterly problematic. The dominance of a term can only
be established by deferring - temporarily pushing to the background - the opposite which
permeates it.
The first step in Demda's strategy of deconstruction is to demonstrate that the
hierarchy in binary oppositions can logically be reversed: in Derrida's reading of
philosophical texts, culture becomes anterior to nature, as dces writing to speech,
signifier to signified, etc. The overturning of the hierarchy between writing and speech
is paradigmatic. Derrida shows that in philosophic texts from Plato to Saussure, speech
is considered to be superior and anterior to writing. Writing is inferior because it always
entails a risk of loss of ineaning: written language can easily be misinterpreted or
manipulated because the author, the original addressee and the context of writing are in
many cases no longer present. In speech, however, "meaning is produced from within
the speaker's body, and is perceived in the very instant of its production, [appearing] to
secure the immediate return of intended meaning to the intending consciousness in a
closed and secure circle of immanence" (Dews 1987: 10). Writing is posterior since (in
phonetic-alphabetical scripts) it is a derivative of spcech.2
Nonetheless, writing can never completely be repressed. Thus, Socrates' dialogues
which purportedly demonstrate the superiority of speech have come down to us in the
writings of Plato. And Saussure, in explaining the differential character of speech, uses
writing as a model: "Since an identical state of affairs is observable in writing, another
system of signs, we shall use writing to draw some comparisons that will clarify the
whole issue" (quoted in Culler 1979: 170). Derrida calls such a textual movement an
instance of "self-deconstruction". "Having established a hierarchy that made writing a
form derivative from speech, Saussure's own argument shows that this relationship can
be reversed and presents speech as a species of writing, a manifestation of the principles
that are at work in writing (...) The marginal in its very marginality turns out to
characterize the central object of discussion" (Culler 1979: 171).
However, overturning the hierarchy is not the ultimate goal of deconstruction, but
only a step in a procedure aimed at the displacement of the hierarchy. Derrida
substitutes the logic of "supplementarity" for the logic of opposition and hierarchy. Since
no concept can have meaning in and by itself, it derives its meaning from the traces of
other concepts from which it can be differentiated. "Culture" is exterior to "nature"5
since nature is defined as an absence of "culture". But at the same time "culture" is
interior to "nature", for without a trace of "culture" the concept of "nature" has no
meaning. The interioritylexteriority of a supplement is undecidable. More generally,
since no concept can bear meaning in isolation, systems of thought that are built on the
primacy of a specific concept entail undecidables.
Deconstruction focuses on the common ground between the opposites, which
makes possible the play in which the identity of both terms is constituted. The aim is to
be alive to the impure mixture of terms relating to each other but not reducible to each
other. The approach shows how in a given text the subordinated term, effaced in the
course of the argumentation, is always already inscribed in the privileged term.
Thus, the goal of deconstruction is not to establish a new and superior
philosophical system, but to demonstrate that no such system can ever escape from the
differential movement of language. In fact, the capacity of a text to persuade hinges on
undecidables that remain unnoticed in a sympathetic (or naive) reading. Deconstruction,
then, is a procedure for undermining unwarranted reliance on what a text seems to
communicate at the surface.
Deconstruction as a Procedure
Derrida has always refused systematic codification of the deconstruction method. For
that reason, secondary sources (predominantly Gasché 1986) were used to reconstruct
the rudiments of the method.
Deconstruction, as used in this article, consists of two general principles (P1,2)
and four procedural rules (R1,..,4):
P1: The text to be deconstructed is criticized from within, i.e., using arguments
provided by the text itself. This is different from a criticism based on a theory that
is seen as being closer to some objective truth.
R1: Start with a careful 'conventional' analysis of the argumentation of the text. Try to
understand what claims are made, and how these claims are made. Search for
places where the text "seems to transgress its own system of values" (Spivak 1977:
xlix), e.g., because a term is suddenly used with a different meaning. These
ambiguities, paradoxes, aporias, etc., reveal cracks in the textual system that in the
next stage can be used for the deconstruction proper.'
R2: Use the ambiguities, etc., found in the preceàing phase for the identification of the
central opposition that determines the architecture of the text. Be aware of the fact
that in many cases the suppressed concept is not even mentioned.
R3: Reverse the hierarchy within the central opposi[ion in order to put the spotlight on
the concept treated as posterior, imperfect, invalid, or unwanted in the original
text.
R4: Show that the posterior, imperfect, invalid or unwanted concept is indispensable.
Demonstrate how both terms relate to each other, and how the suppressed term6
implicitly enters the argumentation at crucial points.
P2: The purpose of deconstruction is not to build an alternative system, but rather to
show how every order is necessarily temporary and incomplete.
This working model will doubtlessly be seen by some as a caricature of deconstruction
rather than a reasonably adequate summary of Derrida's approach. As a matter of fact,
given Derrida apodeictic statement that "all sentences of the type 'deconstruction is X'
(...) a priori miss the point" (quoted in Lehman 1991: 23), this kind of criticism is
unavoidable, and it has been raised against every attempt to "tame" deconstruction (Ellis
1989: 10). In any case, it is with this simplified model that the task of deconstructing
Williamson's Economic Institutions of Capitalism will be entered on.
3. DECONSTRUCTING TRANSACTION COST ECONOMICS
The Economic Institutions of Capitalism
Transaction cost economics (TCE), in large part developed by Oliver Williamson
(Williamson 1975; 1979; 1985; 1991) is important because it purports to answer a
number of questions central to organization theory, viz., questions pertaining to the
boundaries of organizations, to the internal structure of organizations, and to
relationships between organizations. Furthermore, TCE has also stimulated a
considerable amount of empirical research (for an overview, see Joskow 1988;
Noorderhaven 1993a). In addition, Williamson explicitly aspires to build a bridge
between economic and behavioral approaches to organizations (Williamson 1985; 1988a;
1988b; 1991). For these reasons, TCE is an excellent object for a deconstructive effort.
The theory has found its most complete codification in Williamson's Economic
Institutions of Capitalism (EIC) (Williamson 1985). Later formulations (e.g., Williamson
1988a; 1991; 1992) are geared to specific applications or elaborate only parts of the
argument. Therefore I will focus on EIC in this article. Analysis of one of the other
publications, e.g., Williamson (1991), would yield the same result, but with less
richness of illustration.
I will assume that the reader is familiar with the general outlines of TCE. The
analysis will focus on the comparative assessment of governance forms in the case of a
transaction supported by investments in highly specific assets. Because actors are
assumed to be opportunistic, these investments will, in the absence of adequate
safeguards, lead to costly haggling and expose the party incurring them to the risk of
expropriation. If actors had unbounded rational faculties, a complete contingent contract
safeguarding specific investments could be written. However, TCE assumes bounded
rationality (EIC: 45).
The argument in this article concentrates on opportunism and its consequences for
the governance of transactions. Actually, both opportunism and bounded rationality are
crucial in Williamson's explanation of governance structures. The central question of
economic organization is to "devise contract and governance structures that have the
purpose and effect of economizing on bounded rationality while simultaneously
safeguarding transactions against the hazards of opportunism" (EIC: XIII). The reason7
for me to concentrate on opportunism is that Williamson himself seems to all but
dispatch his assumption of bounded rationality when stressing the "strong commitment to
intended rationality" of TCE (EIC: 387). All the same, another deconstruction of TCE
could be performed, parallel to the one in this article but hinging on bounded rationality
instead of opportunism.'
As a consequence of opportunism (and bounded rationality), market contracting
must in case of non-trivial asset specificity and uncertainty give way to other forms of
contracting. One possibility is that the parties craft their relationship in such a way that
they can make credible commitments while maintaining their independence. The
commitment of the less vulnerable party not to indulge in opportunistic behavior can be
made credible if it posts a hostage: something it values will be lost if the relationship is
discontinued. In this way the balance in the transaction relation is restored (EIC: 169-
175). To give an example of a hostage: if a subcontractor of a manufacturing firm
invests in a press that is specific to the kind of jobs it performs for that manufacturer,
the manufacturer itself may invest in a mould specific to the press used by the
subcontractor. A durable bond is thus forged between both parties. Bilateral contracting,
effectively isolated from all other potential parties in the market, is substituted for
market contracting (EIC: 75-77).
In other cases (e.g., very high levels of asset specificity, or very strong
uncertainty) exchange of hostages offers insufficient protection against the vagaries of
opportunism, and bilateral governance gives way to unified governance. The formerly
independent parties are placed under central authority: a hierarchy is substituted for the
market (EIC: 78).
The Logic of TCE
A strong logic rules TCE as expounded in EIC. On the one hand, transactions can be
grouped according to the level of asset specificity associated with them. On the other
hand, we see a range of governance structures with differential opportunism-curbing
properties. These various governance structures are also distinguished by differential
costs: real costs are associated with negotiating, writing, monitoring and enforcing
contracts, and, in addition, governance structures that shut out the market suffer from a
loss of incentives. At low levels of asset specificity, a specialized governance swcture
(e.g., a hierarchy) is assumed to be more expensive than a general-purpose governance
structure (the market) (EIC: 91). But at high levels of asset specificity, market
governance breaks down (becomes prohibitively expensive) and gives way to specialized
governance structures.
The logic of this argumentation hinges on its methodological individualism. In all
cases economic interaction is conceptualized as transactions between individual actors. In
the case of market governance, transactions are bargains made in the marketplace. In the
case of unified governance, transactions are assumed to take place if "a good or service
is transferred across a technologically separable interface" (EIC: 1). This definition
enables TCE to put managers within one and the same firm on a par with parties to a
market transaction.
The central place of inethodological individualism is also reflected in the use of the
concepts of "contract" and "contracting". A glance at the subject index of EIC shows8
that these concepts permeate TCE (EIC: 443-444). In a consistent idiom, Williamson
speaks not only of "market contracting" and "bilateral contracting", but also of "unified
contracting" (EIC: 115). But this last phrase reveals a crack in the logic of TCE upon
which the chisel of deconstruction can be brought to bear. For surely unification
forecloses contracting in the normal sense of the word. Williamson persists in the use of
the word "contracting" to stress that here also, individual opportunistic actors are
interacting. But the word "unified" at the same time suggests that individuality and
opportunism is somehow dissolved. Thus the phrase "unified contracting" brings to our
attention a fundamental question: How can the unified governance swcture safeguard
transactions if the parties remain relentlessly opportunistic?
TCE has no satisfactory answer to this question (indeed, cannot have such an
answer). To demonstrate this the exact position of TCE vis-à-vis opportunism must first
be assessed.
TCE and Opponunism
The assumption of opportunism is one of the distinctive features of TCE. Opportunism
refers to "self-interest seeking with guile" (EIC: 47). The image of human agents is
grim: they are assumed to lie, steal, and cheat, as well as to use more subtle forms of
deceit (EIC: 47). Qualifications of this picture are scattered throughout EIC, but the core
of the opportunism assumption is reconfirmed time and again (see Box 1 for examples).
BOX 1 ABOUT HERE
Williamson makes explicit that adopting this assumption dces not mean that all
parties are assumed to be opportunistic in the same degree. "[S]ome individuals are
opportunistic some of the time, and [...] differential trustworthiness is rarely transparent
ex ante" (EIC: 64).
Two remedies for opportunism are mentioned: screening and safeguarding.
However, screening for opportunism hardly plays a role in EIC. In fact, the only two
allusions to screening in EIC I have been able to track down suggest that this remedy is
impotent: the possibility of screening for trustworthiness is indicated to be unlikely
(EIC: 58), and organizadons based on trust are assumed to be easily invaded by
opportunistic agents, presumably because screening is not effective (EIC: 64-65). TCE is
clearly focused on the second remedy: the crafting of opportunism-curbing governance
swctures.
This concentration on safeguards and neglect of screening have the effect of
suggesting that the condition of opportunism, notwithstanding Williamson's assertion to
the contrary, is pervasive. This effect is strengthened by the way in which departures
from opportunism are described. For instance, in explaining Japanese subcontracting
practices, Williamson asserts that "[t]he hazards of trading are less severe in Japan than
in the United States because of cultural and institutional checks on opportunism" (EIC:
122). Here we are far removed from Rousseau's assertion that evil is exterior to nature
(Derrida 1977: 145). On the contrary, opportunism forms the invariant core of economic9
actors; trustworthiness is a supplement that varies from country to country, depending
on culture and institutions.
The assumption of opportunism is defended by comparing TCE to at least equally
unrealistic approaches that are based on the complete absence of opportunism. These
'utopian' modes of organization can be easily dismissed (EIC: 50-52). But a true test of
TCE would consist in a confrontation with a theory with more differentiated assumptions
concerning human nature rather than utopian theory (Noorderhaven 1993b). As it is,
with opportunism kept free from the impurities of alternative motivational bases, one
cannot help wondering how governance structures are to keep in check the obdurate
inhabitants of TCE.
Opponunism and Governance
Inspection of the discussion of the comparative advantages and disadvantages of unified
governance and market (or bilateral) governance in EIC is instructive. Two kinds of
differences between both governance structures can be distinguished: differences in
incentives and differences in the monitoring, controlling and auditing apparatus (EIC:
154-155).
An independent party, being a residual claimant, has strong incentives to make the
most out of a deal. This has positive consequences, as independent parties will try to
work as efficiently as possible. But if the condition of asset specificity applies, strong
incentives lead to opportunistic seeking of quasi-rents: the party who has incurred
investments in transaction specific assets will be put under pressure. Under unified
governance, economic actors, assuming that they work for a fixed salary, are under a
regime of weak incentives. This attenuates the proclivity for opportunistic haggling over
transaction specific assets, but also weakens the drive for efficiency.
Unified governance allows parties to make decisions sequentially during the
consummation of the transaction, rather than trying to fix everything in a complex
contract ex ante. Thus economizing on bounded rationality is possible. But how is
unified governance assumed to check opportunism? For one thing, costly haggling is
avoided as decisions are made by fiat (EIC: 76). The power of fiat is founded on
ownership: managers derive their authority from the fiat of their superiors and ultimately
from that of the board of directors and stockholders. Within wide limits this right of fiat
remains unquestioned: legal courts deem internal decisions to lie outside their
jurisdiction (EIC: 154n).5
Furthermore, unified governance has superior auditing features. Whereas auditing
across ownership boundaries is severely hindered by obfuscation and cover-up, internal
auditing is assumed to meet with greater cooperation, because organization members
have an interest in maintaining the integrity of the organization. "If, therefore, heads
must roll in an integrated division where cost excesses have become great, and if guilty
and innocent in these circumstances go down together, then it is easy to understand how
those who are not implicated in malfeasance will collaborate early and actively with
internal auditors" (EIC: 155).
In the final analysis, all differences between unified and marketlbilateral
governance can be reduced to differences in incentive features. The power of fiat
ultimately resides in the fact that an employee within a certain "zone of acceptance" is10
indifferent as to the exact content of the work to which he will be assigned (EIC: 218).
This indifference in turn is based on the fact that an employee has contracted for a fixed
salary and therefore faces what Williamson calls "weak incentives".6 As was seen
before, the effectiveness of internal auditing depends on the fact that actors are
confronted with different incentives in the case of internal audits as compared to external
audits (see also EIC: 248-250).'
Thus the quintessence of the switch from market governance to unified governance
is that of substituting "weak incentives" for "strong incentives". But "weak" and
"strong" are deceptive adjectives in this context. A member of an organization faces
weak incentives to haggle about specialized assets, but strong incentives to "shirk" or
"consume on the job". In other words, unified governance reduces the risk of
opportunistic rent-seeking, but at the price of introducing larger opportunities for
shirking.
It is interesting to disentangle the convolutions of the argumentation with respect to
this trade-off in EIC. In Chapter 3, the superiority of unified governance for recurrent
transactions at high levels of asset specificity is alleged. For a discussion of the reasons
underlying this assumption Williamson refers to Chapter 4. In Chapter 4, however, we
read:
[I]nternal organization has access to distinctive governance instruments. The
differences between market and internal organization in incentive and control
respects are developed in Chapter 6. For my purpose here, I take these as given.
(EIC: 90)
Chapter 6, however, dces not focus on the advantages of unified governance, but rather
on the limitatíons of internal organization. Where one expects to learn why transactions
are sometimes transferred out of the market and into a firm, Williamson sets out to
explain why not every transaction is internalized. A number of problems of internal
organization are discussed: meddlesomeness of managers, the use of the resources of the
organization to pursue subgoals, exploitation of the firm by minimal performance,
politicization of decision making, reciprocal managerial back-scratching, reluctancy of
managers to abolish their own jobs, etc. (EIC: 148-153).g
Only after having discussed all these problems dces Williamson reverse the
question, and ask: "why can't the market replicate the firm?" (EIC: 154). Subsequently,
the two advantages of internal organization mentioned above are put forward: weaker
incentives for opportunistic rent-seeking and stronger auditing abilities (EIC: 154-155).
The very conciseness of the discussion of the advantages of internal organization creates
the impression that within the TCE framework it is far more difficult to explain how
unified governance attenuates opportunism than to explain how opportunism undermines
unified governance.
In some instances, particularities in the presentation of the argument have the
effect of concealing this TCE predicament. Thus, all the problems of unified governance
stemming from opportunism of agents (workers versus lower managers, lower managers
versus higher managers, higher managers versus the board of directors) are discussed in
Chapter 6(pages 131-162). Only later, in Chapter 12 (pages 298-325), is the
complementary issue of opportunism of principals (lower managers versus workers,
higher managers versus lower managers) dealt with. Together these two discussions11
evoke an image of internal organization as a kind of Hobbesian war of all against all, a
picture which devastates the plausibility of the effectiveness of unified governance, but is
obscured if both chapters are read with a considerable time interval. This kind of
dispersion is one of the phenomena which deconstruction warns against (Bennington and
Derrida 1991: 71).
Another example is the assertion that "[t]he main benefits of vertical integration
(...) are discerned by examining the problems attending autonomous contracting when
the parties to a trade are operating in a bilateral exchange relation. The main costs of
vertical integration are more difficult to discover, however" (EIC: 153). The first
remazk suggests that the weak points of market governance are by implication the strong
points of internal organization. This is, however, what we would expect the text to
substantiate. The second remark closes the discussion of the advantages of internal
organization, and points at the problem of assessing the disadvantages. This assessment
is said to be impeded by the "underdeveloped state of the bureaucratic failure literature"
(EIC: 153; see also EIC: 392). In this fashion, although the disadvantages of internal
organization have been discussed in much more detail than the advantages of internal
organization, the alleged underdevelopment of the "bureaucratic failure literature" is
suggested to be responsible for any shortfalls of this discussion.
These textual movements give the impression of a theory oscillating between
market and organization, neither of which can plausibly be azgued to offer "a safe haven
for specific assets" (EIC: 248) against the relentless opportunism of "contractual man".
Governance and Trusnvorthiness
In the context of the díscussions of the organization of work and the organization of
labor (chapters 9 and 10 of EIC), Williamson at last introduces two azguments that are
to make plausible the superiority of unified governance in curbing opportunism:
"atmosphere" and "consummate cooperation".
"Atmosphere" is a concept introduced in an earlier work by Williamson
(Williamson 1975), but is hardly used in TCE as it is dealt with in later texts.' The
concept implies that organizational modes may not only differ in efficiency respects, but
may also engender differences in attitudes. For instance, workers who are closely
monitored may respond by displaying a narrow focus on the quid pro quo, while
workers who are given more leeway may display a less calculative attitude (Williamson
1975: 79). In EIC, the concept is evoked without repeating this discussion. Loose
allusions to the "sense that managers and workers are 'in this together"' and the benefits
of "employee loyalty" (EIC: 247) can be associated with "atmosphere", but this
connection is not made ezplicit.
The discussion of "consummate cooperation" is more elaborate. This concept is
opposed to that of "perfunctory cooperation":
Consummate cooperation is an affirmative job attitude whereby gaps are filled,
initiative is taken, and judgement is exercised in an instrumental way. Perfunctory
cooperation involves working to rules and in other respects performing in a
minimally acceptable way (EIC: 262-263).12
It is not difficult to imagine the differential impact of consummate and perfunctory
cooperation on the efficiency of unified governance. However, a theory building on an
assumption of opportunism cannot invoke consummate cooperation to explain the
functioning of internal organization. To be sure, opportunistic actors will fill gaps, take
initiative, and exercise judgement, but in ways that undermine the viability of unified
governance rather than enhance its efficiency.
This, then, appears to be the azgumentational structure of TCE: first the condition
of opportunism is stressed in order to posit the problem of economic organization;
subsequently, it is azgued that under certain circumstances market governance is unable
to safeguazd transactions against the hazards of opportunism, hence a shift to unified
governance is assumed to occur; then the shortfalls of unified governance (again
stemming from opportunism) are discussed, in order to explain why firms do not replace
markets altogether. The superiority of unified governance in curbing opportunism is
hardly elaborated, but the few arguments that aze put forth amount to a contamination of
the purity of opportunism.'o Thus Williamson, like Rousseau and Saussure,
"accumulates contradictory arguments to bring about a satisfactory decision" (Derrida
1977: 45). The central aporia of TCE is that for its logic to apply it is necessary to
stress that actors are opportunistic, but this same relentless opportunism undermines the
very structures that are assumed to check it."
4. IlVIPLICATIONS AND CONCLUSIONS
The deconstruction in this article has been confined to one particulaz text from the
school of thought of transaction cost economics. The argument could be extended to
other texts, and to other branches of organizational economics, however. This contention
cannot be substantiated in this article, but one example can be given. In the
agencylproperty rights theory tradition the opportunism of agents is assumed to be
curbed by well-designed contracts. The theory fails, however, to give a satisfactory
account of how these contracts are enforced. In fact, with the formulation of the contract
the agency problem is considered to be solved. This means that opportunism is
effectively suspended as faz as the rule of the contract is concerned. And not without
reason, for as I have demonstrated elsewhere, agencylproperty rights theory is in dire
straits if it has to explain contract enforcement (Noorderhaven 1992). Thus, in this
branch of organizational economics, the assumption of opportunism likewise needs some
implicit dilution.
What should be the conclusion drawn from the deconstruction of TCE? It is
emphatically not that TCE, or more generally organizational economics, is void. That
would be a naive inference given that deconstruction holds that every theory by necessity
includes the kind of aporias revealed in TCE (cf. Gasché 1986: 136). Likewise, it is not
that we should discard the notion of opportunism, and embrace assumptions opposite to
those of TCE. The development of organization theory is not well served by a swing
from one extreme to the other (cf. Perrow's 1973 analysis of the forces of darkness and
the forces of light in the history of organization theory).
One valid conclusion is that the limitations of the kind of rigid deduction from
stark assumptions as employed by TCE should be kept in mind. Certain aspects of the
phenomenon of economic organization have been elucidated (some of which, perhaps,13
have been neglected by received behavioral organization theory), but at the price of
leaving other aspects in the dark. The unremitting hammering away at opportunism by
organizational economics has put the question why organization members obey rules and
acquiesce in hierarchical authority on the agenda. The time has come for a well-
considered dilution of the assumption of opportunism, in order to make headway in
improving the descriptive validity of the theory.
One subordinate conclusion does, however, have to be mentioned first.
Organizational economists have, in the past, strongly criticized received behavioral
organization theory. Williamson, for instance, deplored the "underdeveloped" and
"primitive" state of received theories of bureaucracy (EIC: 153; 392).12 Jensen (1983)
stated that organization theory was still in its infancy, and predicted a revolution in this
field when economists took the matter in hand. The analysis in this article suggests that
the state of affairs in organizational economics justifies no complacency, and that the
balance between criticism and appreciation of received behavioral organization theory
should be restored.
More importantly, in order to enhance the explanatory power of TCE (or
organizational economics, in general) a more differentiated approach to opportunism is
necessary. As the preceding discussion has shown, a concept derives its meaning from
other concepts from which it can be distinguished. This is also true of opportunism:
opportunism is the absence of trustworthiness. But if opportunism is to be defined as an
absence of trustworthiness, the existence of trustworthiness is presupposed. A theory of
organization could take the existence of opportunism and trustworthiness as a profitable
point of departure. One task would be to explain how differences in opportunism affect
economic organization. This would entail theories of screening and selection, and of the
building of safeguarding structures. Another task would be to explain how economic
organization affects opportunism. In both cases, an assumption of pure opportunism or
pure trustworthiness, at the level of the individual or at the level of the population,
would be unproductive.13
Williamson, in conclusion, can be quoted once more with approval: "a richer
theory of economic organization awaits deeper behavioral insights" (EIC: 392). Much
work remains to be done.la
NOTES
~ I am grateful to Egidius Berns and Bart Nooteboom for valuable comments and
criticisms.
1. This discussion is based on Berns (1981; 1986; 1990); Culler (1979); Dews
(1987); Norris (1991); Sturrock (1979); and Vasterling (1987).
2. It is no accident that writing is seen as inferior to speaking in the Western
philosophical (metaphysical) tradition. The indissolubility of signifier and signified
brings the exteriority of language dangerously close to the interior source of
meaning. Meaning could be seen as dependent on language, a position that is
unacceptable in metaphysical thought. In order to neutralize this threat the more
interior spoken sign is given preference over the written sign (Berns 1990).
3. "Aporia", deriving from the Greek word meaning "unpassable path", is a concept
from traditional rhetoric, denoting a self-engendered paradox (Norris 1991: 49).
The concept is used frequently by Derrida. "What deconstruction persistently
reveals is an ultimate impasse of thought engendered by a rhetoric that always
insinuates its own textual workings into the truth claims of philosophy" (ibidem).
4. Deconstructions such as this could be based on the epistemological criticism of
TCE contained in Noorderhaven et al. (1993) and Nooteboom (1992).
Deconstructive efforts focusing on bounded rationality can take as a point of
departure the statement on page 38 of EIC: "I consistently assume that the parties
to a contract are hard-headed and that the ramifications of alternative contracts are
intuited if not fully thought through." This effectively dces away with bounded
rationality.
5. In Williamson (1991), this aspect of unified governance is worked out more
systematically in the discussion of the concept of "forbearance".
6. An employee also has a more limited scope for opportunistic behavior, as he
cannot as easily exit while maintaining the fruits of his opportunism as an
independent party (EIC: I55). At an earlier stage of the analysis, though,
Williamson consistently abstracted from "the special hazards posed by fly-by-night
firms" (EIC: 72). Therefore the argument, here, appears to be somewhat ad-hoc.
7. In principle autonomous trading partners could write a contract introducing the
same auditing procedures normally found within firms. Because the incentives
differ, however, these procedures are less efficient if applied across the boundaries
of firms; "market and internal organization differ in 'informal organization'
respects" (EIC: 154).
8. To this could be added influence activities performed by organization members in
order to influence decision makers, see Milgrom and Roberts (1988).15
9. This expulsion may very well be one of the reasons for the opposition between
TCE and received behavioral organization theory, cf. Schreuder (1991).
10. A comparison with the "impurity principle" formulated by Hogdson (1988: 167-
171; 254-262) is apposite but falls outside the scope of this paper.
11. Granovetter (1985) makes a comparable observation, stating that TCE alternates
between an undersocialized and an oversocialized view of man in describing
market and hierarchy, respectively, though that dces not seem to be quite the
point. TCE ostensively holds to the assumption of opportunism, even in explaining
unified governance (witness the vivid description of the hazards of internal
organization). Small but essential impurities to the principle of opportunism are,
however, introduced in passing.
12. In all fairness, Williamson also says that "economics should both speak and listen
to organization theory" (EIC: 402).
13. In the first case, opportunism is seen as an exogenous variable. One possible line
of reasoning would then be that the average level of opportunism may be assumed
to vary between cultural-institutional settings. Williamson hints at this explanation
by alluding to "low-trust" and "high-trust" societies (EIC: 392). In the second
approach, opportunism enters as an endogenous variable. An example of a study in
this vein (although from an entirely different tradition) is Fox's (1974) analysis of
vicious low-trust and virtuous high-trust circles in management-labor relations.16
BOX 1: WILLIAMSON ON OPPORTUNISM
RELATIVIZATION OF THE ASSUMPTION OF OPPORTUNISM IS NECESSARY,
AS:
~` treatment ofthe ramj~cations of digniryfor economic organization is sorety needed
(44, note 3);
~` individual andpersonal trust relations evolve at the interface between supplier and
buyer (62);
~` [wJhere personal integrity is believed to be operative, individuals [...Jmay refuse to
be part ofopportunistic efforts (62);
~` transactions do enjoy the added safeguard ofpersonal honor and integriry of the
individuals who negotiate the terms (63, note 22);
~` the spirit in which adaptations are e„~ected is [...Jimportant (76);
~` [sJimple regardfor human dignity (151);
'[aJsense that management and workers are "in this together" furthers the purpose of
effective adaptation (24~;
~` suspicions andprecautions can be andsometimes are taken to excess (388);
~` opportunism is a narrow prescription, [iJt makes little provision for attributes such as
kindness, sympathy, solidarity, and the like (391);
~` the importance ofdeepening our knowledge of economic organization in dignitary
re.spects is enormous (405);
~` transaction cost economics must be placed in perspective, lest it become dehumanizing
(405);
~` calculativeness can get in the way oftrust (405).
BUT:
~` [oJpportunism is a subtle and pervasive condition of human nature with which the
study ofeconomie organization must be aetively concerned (6);
~` [gJovernance structures that at[enuate opportunism [...Jare evidently needed (63);
~` organizational forms which are based on nonopportunistic principles are rendered [...J
nonviable by the intrusion of unscreened and unpenalized opportunists (65);
~` the bounded rationalitylopportunism view accords with realiry (6~;
~` blatant opportunism may be rare, it nevertheless illustrates the problems that arise
when trading parties possessing the behavioral attributes of human nature as we know
it arejoined (80);
~` assuming that eommunitarian values play a role is unneeded and unhelpful (166);
' a healthy regardfor opportunism is essential to an understanding of the purposes
served by complex modes ofeconomic organization (388);
~` much ofthe success of economics in relation to the other social sciences occurs
because calculativeness is presumed to be present in nontrivial degree (391);
~` [tJhis unattraetive view of human nature [...Jgenerates numerous refutable
implications (392).
Note: Page numbers refer to Williamson (1985), direct quotations are in italics.17
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